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Abstract
During the COVID-19 pandemic of 2019/2020, authorities have used temporary
ad-hoc policy measures, such as lockdowns and mass quarantines, to slow its trans-
mission. However, the consequences of widespread use of these unprecedented mea-
sures are poorly understood. To contribute to the understanding of the economic
and human consequences of such policy measures, we therefore construct a math-
ematical model of an economy under the impact of a pandemic, select parameter
values to represent the global economy under the impact of COVID-19, and perform
numerical experiments by simulating a large number of possible policy responses.
By varying the starting date of the policy intervention in the simulated scenarios,
we find that the most effective policy intervention occurs around the time when
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the number of active infections is growing at its highest rate. The degree of the
intervention, above a certain threshold, does not appear to have a great impact on
the outcomes in our simulations, due to the strongly concave relationship we assume
between production shortfall and reduction in the infection rate. Our experiments
further suggest that the intervention should last until after the peak determined by
the reduced infection rate. The model and its implementation, along with the gen-
eral insights from our policy experiments, may help policymakers design effective
emergency policy responses in the face a serious pandemic, and contribute to our
understanding of the relationship between the economic growth and the spread of
infectious diseases.
Keywords: Economic growth, Pandemics, COVID-19, Policy.
1 Introduction
Pandemics have caused death and destruction several times throughout human history,
and have caused large and lasting impacts on society: for example the Black Death in
14th century Europe (Herlihy, 1997), the Spanish flu in 1918-1920 (Johnson and Mueller,
2002), HIV in the 1980s (Pope and Haase, 2003), and H1N1 in 2009 (Trifonov et al.,
2009). In 2019 and 2020, policymakers have struggled to design effective policy responses
to the COVID-19 pandemic, as authorities have resorted to unprecedented and widespread
use of temporary emergency measures such as lockdowns, mass quarantines, and other
“social distancing” measures, despite that the human and economic consequences of these
ad-hoc interventions are poorly understood. It is clear that more research is needed
on effective policy intervention during pandemics, and how to mitigate its human and
economic impacts.
Therefore, we incorporate a model of disease transmission into a model of economic
growth, considering that policymakers can implement temporary policies that simultane-
ously slow the spread of the disease and lower the economic output. We then select model
parameters so as to represent the global economy under the impact of COVID-19, and
perform numerical simulations of various policies to provide insights into the trade-offs
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between short- and long-term human and economic outcomes. The policy simulations
will help policymakers understand how altering the starting time, degree, and duration
of the policy intervention can impact the outcomes, and contribute to the understanding
of how to design effective policies to confront rapidly spreading pandemics.
A number of earlier studies have already incorporated the dynamics of infectious dis-
eases into models of economic growth, but for different purposes.
Herlihy (1997) and Hansen and Prescott (2002) assert that – in the context of the Black
Death – the increased mortality caused great damage to the economy, as labour supply
contracts. The contraction in labour supply tends to increase the real wage, and this
induced the substitution of labour for capital and triggered an economic modernisation
that eventually leads to greater economic growth. Both Herlihy (1997) and Hansen and
Prescott (2002), however, consider the increased mortality as a purely exogenous event,
and the model developed by Hansen and Prescott (2002) is more concerned with the
dynamics of the economic transition than the impact of the pandemic in itself. That is,
the model does not actually incorporate any disease dynamics, and the investigations are
primarily focused on understanding historical developments rather than providing useful
input for policymakers during an ongoing pandemic.
Delfino and Simmons (2000), however, argues that there are causal links in both direc-
tions in the interaction between the economy and the disease transmission. Furthermore,
they embed a Lotka-Volterra model of disease transmission into a model of economic
growth, assuming only healthy individuals are productive and that the level of prosperity
affects the demographic-epidemiological parameters (growth rate of the healthy popula-
tion, infection rate, and mortality rate). This model, however, does not consider that
authorities and populations can make temporary policy interventions during the spread
of a pandemic, which may alter both the disease transmission and its economic impact: in
their model, economic development is the main channel through which the economy affects
disease transmission, and the model is not used to explore temporary policy interventions
during specific rapidly-spreading pandemics.
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Bonds et al. (2010) argue that the poverty traps1 arise when combining models of
infectious diseases and of economic development, and these may help explain the differ-
ences in economic development between countries. The authors support their argument
with an empirical investigation, and suggest that investments in health are important for
breaking the cycle of poverty.
Goenka et al. (2010), Goenka et al. (2014) and Goenka and Liu (2019) also integrate
disease transmission directly into an economic growth model, and allow investments in
health – building health capital – to affect the epidemiological parameters. Optimal in-
vestments in health and the accumulation of health capital, however, are different from
designing temporary policies during a pandemic. In the model presented by Goenka and
Liu (2012), the disease transmission is considered exogenous – that is, there is no chan-
nel through which policy can impact the disease transmission. In addition, these studies
disconsider disease-related mortality, which is likely to be of importance for COVID-19,
as this is considered one of the main channels through which serious pandemics affect the
economy (Hansen and Prescott, 2002). These studies, however, also show that integrat-
ing disease transmission in economic growth models results in multiple steady states, as
did Bonds et al. (2010), and we are therefore careful to choose an approach that is not
sensitive to this: we use our model to run numerical experiments, solving the numerical
optimisation problem using backwards induction.
The macroeconomic impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic has also received much research
attention. The studies by Cuddington (1993b), Cuddington (1993a), and Cuddington and
Hancock (1994) used a modified Solow model to estimate the macroeconomic impacts of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic on select African economies, although the model assumes that
the trajectory of the epidemic is entirely exogenous. Haacker (2002) also uses a sim-
ilar methodological setup. Although Arndt (2003) study the economic impacts of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic using a computable general equilibrium approach with disaggregated
demographic groups and productive sectors, their model still assumes the disease trans-
mission is exogenous, as well as Cuesta (2010). Azomahou et al. (2016) allow mortality
1That is, in this particular case, that a greater disease burden leads to more poverty, and more poverty
leads to a greater disease burden, so as to create a self-perpetuating effect.
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rate to depend on health expenditure, but the disease transmission still remains exoge-
nous to their model. Econometric studies on the macroeconomic impact of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic have found mixed results (Bloom and Mahal, 1997; Dixon et al., 2001; Tandon,
2005; McDonald and Roberts, 2006). In addition to all of these studies treating disease
transmission as exogenous, the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the COVID-19 pandemic are
so different that insights from the study of the HIV/AIDS epidemic are not necessarily
directly applicable to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that many authorities are prepared to imple-
ment strict and dramatic emergency policies at short notice in order to slow down the
spread of a serious pandemic. However, we have been unable to find a rigorous analy-
sis of the economic and human consequences of such measures in the existing literature.
By implementing policies whose impacts on society are not well understood, authorities
could damage to the economy whilst still failing to lower the transmission rate of the
disease. There is therefore an urgent need for research that develops guidelines for the
use of these emergency measures, and to help policymakers understand their impacts and
consequences.
We contribute to the study of the efficiency, impacts, and consequences of tempo-
rary emergency measures during a pandemic by incorporating a policy parameter into a
model that integrates disease transmission dynamics and economic growth. Our model
provides a theoretical framework for understanding the impact of emergency policies on
the trajectory of the pandemic as well as the main economic variables, in light of their
mutual interactions. To gain a deeper understanding of the emergency policies, we select
parameter values such that the model represents the global economy under the impact of
COVID-19, and numerically simulate a large number of scenarios for possible emergency
policies. Using this simulation-based approach, we investigate the impact of altering the
starting date of policy intervention, the degree of the policy intervention, and the duration
of the policy intervention. Altering the simulated policies along these three dimensions
provides insights into the impact of the emergency measures on the course of the pan-
demic and the development of the main economic variables. These insights could help
5
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policymakers design effective emergency responses to pandemics.
Beyond this main contribution, this study makes several minor contributions to the
literature. Firstly, the epidemiological part of our model is based on the SIR model instead
of the SIS model used by Bonds et al. (2010), Goenka et al. (2010), Goenka and Liu (2012),
Goenka et al. (2014) and Goenka and Liu (2019). That is, previous studies are consistent
with diseases for which we do not develop immunity since it allows individuals to con-
tract the disease several times, whereas our model does not permit individuals to contract
the disease more than once. This assumption appears to be more consistent with the
COVID-19 pandemic, and significantly alters the dynamics of the model. Different from
these earlier studies, our model also incorporates disease-related mortalities, since this
appears to be an important channel through which the disease impacts economic growth
(Hansen and Prescott, 2002). Secondly, our model includes a policy variable that per-
mits lowering the infection rate at the expense of lower economic production, an element
which is not found in earlier studies. Thirdly, our study contains some early estimates of
the economic impacts of COVID-19 for Europe’s five largest economies, constructed by
analysing changes in real-time and high-frequency data on electricity demand. Finally, we
make our data and custom computer code freely available, which will hopefully be useful
to the research community and contribute to future developments in the area.
In addition to this introduction, this paper consists of three sections. The following
section presents a mathematical framework that incorporates a model of disease trans-
mission into a model of economic growth, shows how model parameter values were chosen
to fit the model to the global economy during the COVID-19 pandemic, and details the
numerical experiments that were performed. In the third section, we present, interpret,
and discuss the results of the numerical experiments and their implications. In the final
section, we summarise the main findings of the study.
2 Pandemic in an Economic Growth Model
Here we detail the integration of an epidemiological model into a neoclassical model
of economic growth – known as one of the “workhorses” of modern macroeconomics
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(Acemoglu, 2011). We first adapt the SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model of the
spread of an infection, pioneered by Kermack and McKendrick (1927), then incorporate it
into the a model setup similar to the classical Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model in discrete
time. We then explain how we select functional forms and parameters to represent the
global economy and the global spread of COVID-19, before outlining three numerical
experiments designed to give insight into the economic and epidemiological impacts of
various policy alternatives.
2.1 Incorporating Pandemic Dynamics into a Neoclassical Model
of Economic Growth
Here we combine an epidemiological model with a model of economic growth, and con-
centrate on three main bridges between the models. First, we assume that the spread
of a pandemic reduces the labour force, since infected or deceased individuals will not
work, and this reduces economic output. Second, we assume that society incurs addi-
tional direct costs, for instance due to the hospitalisation of infected individuals, and
these costs must be covered with output that would otherwise have been consumed or
invested. Third, we assume that governments may, though policy, simultaneously impact
both the spread of the pandemic and the efficiency of economic production. These inter-
actions between the spread of the pandemic and economic growth are the main focus of
our model, which jointly represents the dynamics of the spread of the pandemic and the
dynamics of economic growth.
The SIR model time (Kermack and McKendrick, 1927; Brauer and Castillo-Chavez,
2012) is a simple Markov model of how an infection spreads in a population over time.
This model divides a population (N) into three categories: Susceptible (S), Infected (I),
and Recovered (R). In each period, the number of susceptible individuals who become
infected is a product of the susceptible population, the number of individuals who are
already infected, and an infection rate b. A given proportion of the infected individuals
(r) also recover in each period.
To incorporate the SIR model into a model of economic growth, we make two adap-
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tations to the basic SIR model. First, we introduce a distinction between recovered
individuals (R) and deceased individuals (D), since recovered individuals will re-enter the
labour force whereas deceased individuals will not: each period, infected individuals will
recover at a rate r and pass away at a rate m. Second, instead of considering the popula-
tion to be of a fixed size, we allow the population to grow over time. Population growth
is usually negligible at the timescale of interest for models of epidemics or pandemics, but
it is significant in the timescales of economic growth. Therefore, we introduce a logistic
model for population growth, and new individuals will be added to the number of suscep-
tible individuals each period. Using two parameters, a1 and a2, to describe the population
growth, we can describe the spread of the pandemic in the population as follows:
Nt+1 = a1Nt + a2N
2
t −mIt (1)
St+1 = St + (a1 − 1)Nt + a2N2t − bStIt (2)
It+1 = It + bStIt − rIt −mIt (3)
Rt+1 = Rt + rIt (4)
Dt+1 = Dt +mIt. (5)
Many variations of the basic SIR model already exist, and it would be possible to incor-
porate more complex dynamics into the epidemiological model. However, this model will
be sufficient for our current purposes.
The model of economic growth assumes that a representative household chooses what
quantity of economic output (Y ) to consume (C) or save (invest) each period in order
to maximise an infinite sum of discounted utility, represented by a logarithmic utility
function. Output is produced by combining labour and capital (K) using a technology
represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale and
total factor productivity At. However, we allow pandemic policy, represented by p, to
reduce the total output, and furthermore assume that only susceptible and recovered
8
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individuals are included in the labour force:
Yt = (1− p)AtKαt (St +Rt)1−α, (6)
in which α represents the output elasticity of capital, and total factor productivity At
grows at a constant rate g:
At+1 = (1 + g)At. (7)
Assuming that physical capital (Kt) depreciates at a rate od δ from one period to the next
and that the pandemic causes direct costs H(·) to society, the capital stock accumulates
according to the following transition equation:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt − Ct −H(·). (8)
Given a utility discount factor β, we assume that a benevolent social planner chooses
an infinite stream of consumption {Ct}∞t=0 to optimise the discounted sum of logarithmic
utility, solving the following maximisation problem:
max
{Ct}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtNt ln
(
Ct
Nt
)
,
while respecting the restrictions represented by equations (1) through (8). Since our
period of interest is actually finite, this maximisation problem can be solved numerically
by backwards induction, provided that the terminal period is chosen so far in the future
that it will not interfere with the period of interest.
2.2 Representing the Global Economy and COVID-19
The model presented in the previous subsection relies on parameters for population dy-
namics, the spread of a pandemic, production of economic output, and the accumulation
of physical capital. In order to perform computational experiments, we need to determine
9
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realistic numerical values for these, as well as initial values for the state variables.
One fundamental issue that we must address is that the study of epidemics and eco-
nomic growth usually consider different timescales: whereas the spread of an epidemic
is usually analysed at a daily or weekly timescale, economic growth is usually studied
at an annual, or even a decennial, timescale. To reconcile these differences, we choose
a daily timescale for our model. A daily timescale is suitable for studying the spread of
a pandemic, since pandemics spread rapidly and their health effects pass almost entirely
within a short timeframe. However, daily resolution is an unusual choice for a model of
economic growth, as capital accumulation, technological progress, and population growth
are almost negligible from one day to the next. During a pandemic, however, daily move-
ments of individuals in and out of the labour force could have a large impact on economic
production, and indirectly on the accumulation of capital – and in order to adequately
capture these effects, we choose a daily resolution for the model. Parameter values for
both the parameters belonging to the economic components, as well as the epidemiological
components, are therefore chosen to a represent a daily timescale.
Population Growth The parameters for the logistic population growth model, a1 and
a2, were selected by first estimating a linear regression model on annual global population
data from the World Bank between 1960 and 20182. The estimation results are shown
in Table 1, and the regression coefficients ay1 and a
y
2 – representing the parameters of an
annual model – were converted into their corresponding daily values by calculating:
a1 = 1 +
ay1 − 1
365
a2 =
ay2
365
.
The fitted values of the population model is shown in Panel (a) of Figure 1, and appear
to match the historical data for global population closely.
Capital Stock We imputed the global physical capital stock by combining annual data
on global gross physical capital formation, available for the period between from the
2Available at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL, accessed on 2020-05-04
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Table 1: Estimated parameters for the Gordon-Schaefer population growth model. The model
uses ordinary least squares, on annual data from 1960 to 2018.
Dependent variable:
World Populationt
WorldPopulationt−1 1.028∗∗∗
(0.001)
World Population2t−1 −2.282× 10−12∗∗∗
(0.000)
Observations 58
R2 1.000
Adjusted R2 1.000
Residual Std. Error 4,813,932.000 (df = 56)
F Statistic 36,877,908.000∗∗∗ (df = 2; 56)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
World Bank3, with an assumed physical capital depreciation rate of δ = 4.46%. This
depreciation rate corresponds to the median value of the national depreciation rates for
2017 listed in the Penn World Tables 9.14, whose distribution is shown in Panel (b) of
Figure 1. The resulting estimated level of global physical capital stock from 1990 to 2019
is shown in Panel (c) of Figure 1.
Production Following Nordhaus (1992), we set the output elasticity of capital to α =
0.3. We then combine annual data of global output from the World Bank between 1990
and 20185 with the global population and the imputed global stock of physical capital, in
order to estimate the total factor productivity, At, and its growth rate, g. This gives an
annual total factor productivity growth rate of around 1.3%, with a corresponding daily
growth rate of around g = 3.55× 10−5 over the period. The modelled global production
is shown in Panel (d) of Figure 1, and fits the observed data relatively well, although the
modelled production level slightly overestimates global production at some points.
3Available at http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/NE.GDI.TOTL.KD, accessed on 2020-05-
04.
4Available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt, accessed on 2020-05-04.
5Available at http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD, accessed on
2020-05-04.
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Figure 1: Calibration of the economic parameters. Panel (a): Global population and one-step-
ahead predicted population from the fitted Gordon-Schaefer population growth model. Panel
(b): National capital depreciation rates from the Penn World Tables 9.1 for 2017, with the
dashed black line marking the median value δ = 4.46%. Panel (c): Imputed values for daily
global physical capital stock. Panel (d): Daily modelled gross world product, using a Cobb-
Douglas production function with imputed daily capital stock, interpolated values for daily
global population, output elasticity of capital set to 0.3, a growth rate for total factor produc-
tivity correspodning to 0.014 annually, and initial total factor productivity set to match actual
production in 1990.
Utility We select an annual utility discount rate that corresponds to an annual rate of
ρ = 8%. This discount rate allows the simulated investment from the model to match the
observed gross physical capital formation in the period between 1990 and 2010, as shown
in Panel (d) of Figure 7. Although this discount rate appears somewhat high, it is not
unreasonable if we take into consideration that the model represents the global economy,
and that large parts of the global population consists of low-income households with high
discount rates.
Excess Direct Pandemic Costs A pandemic directly causes additional costs to soci-
ety, which is captured by the function H(·) in our mathematical model. To model this
cost, we look to the literature which has estimated the excess hospital admission costs
for a recent similar pandemic, the H1N1 pandemic in 2009: for Spain (Galante et al.,
12
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Figure 2: Direct costs.
2012), Greece (Zarogoulidis, 2012), Australia and New Zealand (Higgins et al., 2011),
New Zealand (Wilson et al., 2012), and the United Kingdom (Lau et al., 2019). Fig-
ure 2 shows the direct hospitalisation costs attributed to the H1N1 pandemic in various
countries, along with the number of hospital admissions. Based on these previous cost
estimates for the H1N1 pandemic, we use a flat cost of u = 5, 722 USD per hospital ad-
mission (see Table 2), corresponding to the solid red line in Figure 2. Although we assume
a flat cost per admission, it may be more reasonable in other contexts – for instance when
applying the model to specific regions – to consider a cost function with an increasing
marginal cost: as hospital capacity becomes constrained in the short-run during a surge
of admissions, one could expect the unit cost to increase. However, in the context of our
global model, we do not distinguish between the regions in which the cases occur, and
therefore cannot accurately capture such a saturation effect. Therefore, we choose a direct
cost function that is simply linear in the number of hospital admissions.
We assume that h = 14.7% of the confirmed infected cases will be admitted to hospi-
tal6, and our direct cost function is given by:
Ht = uhbStIt.
6This hospitalisation rate corresponds to the median of USA state level hospitalisation rates reported
in the daily COVID-19 reports from the Center for System Science and Engineering at John Hopkins
University, on the 10th of May 2020, available at https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19.
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Table 2: Esimated direct cost function.
Dependent variable:
Total Costs (USD)
Admissions 5,722.078∗∗∗
(664.874)
Observations 6
R2 0.937
Adjusted R2 0.924
Residual Std. Error 10,643,570.000 (df = 5)
F Statistic 74.068∗∗∗ (df = 1; 5)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Infection, Recovery and Mortality Rates To estimate the mortality and recovery
rates, r and m, we solve the transition equations for the number of recovered Rt (equation
(4)) and the number of deceased Dt (equation (5)) for their respective parameters:
r =
Rt+1 −Rt
It
, m =
Dt+1 −Dt
It
.
Using daily data for the number of confirmed, recovered and deceased cases, made avail-
able by John Hopkins University7, we can calculate the recovery and mortality rates for
each day, as shown in the bottom two rows of Figure 3.
To estimate the infection rate, b, we solve equation (3) for the parameter b:
b =
It+1 − (1− r −m)It
StIt
.
Taking into account that It in the model refers to the number of active cases, whereas the
data reports the accumulated number of cases, and using the population growth model
to help estimate the number of susceptible individuals, we calculate the daily infection
rates, shown in the top row of Figure 3. As the infection rate b varies over time, we
choose a relatively high infection rate to represent the infection rate in the absence of
policy intervention, b0 = 2.041 × 10−11, which equals the upper quartile (75%) of the
7Available at https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19, accessed on 2020-05-06.
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Figure 3: Calibration of the parameters for the SIR model. Panel (a) and (b): the development
and distribution of the SIR infection rate, b. Panel (c) and (d): the development and distribution
of the SIR recovery rate, r. Panel (e) and (f): the development and distribution of the SIR
mortality rate, m.
observed infection rates. As we simulate different intervention policies, this base infection
rate b0 will be modified.
We notice from Figure 3 that the mortality rate appears to rise and fall together with
the infection rate. This might reflect that lack of capacity in a health system increases
mortality rate, and this is therefore a feature that we would like to capture. We therefore
estimate m as a function of b:
m = k1b
k2 ,
in which k1 and k2 are constants. Table 3 shows the regression for estimating the param-
eters k1 and k2, and the fitted function is shown in Figure 4, together with the observed
values of daily infection and mortality rates.
For the recovery rate in the simulations, we select the median of the daily recovery
rates calculated from the data, r = 0.02099, which implies that slightly over 2% of infected
individuals recover from one day to the next. The infection rate, b, however, will be
15
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Table 3: Mortality rate model.
Dependent variable:
ln(Mortality Rate)
ln(Infection Rate) 0.717∗∗∗
(0.065)
Constant 12.561∗∗∗
(1.642)
Observations 104
R2 0.545
Adjusted R2 0.540
Residual Std. Error 0.619 (df = 102)
F Statistic 122.131∗∗∗ (df = 1; 102)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
Infection Rate 1e 10
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
M
or
ta
lit
y 
Ra
te
Observed Values
Fitted Model
Figure 4: Mortality rate and infection rate.
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determined individually for each scenario, and will reflect the pandemic policy simulated
in each of the scenarios. The mortality rate m will be determined by the infection rate b,
according to the relationship between them we estimated earlier.
The Production-Infection Trade-Off Our model assumes that pandemic policy mainly
impacts the spread of the pandemic through manipulating the infection rate b, and mainly
infects economic growth by affecting production of economic output, Yt. Our model con-
tains a single parameter, p, to represent pandemic policy, which directly represents the
shortfall in global production. In order to analyse the trade-off between production and
the infection rate, however, we must establish how the infection rate, b, is impacted by
the policy parameter p – that is, we must quantify how the infection rate responds to
foregone production.
We expect the relationship between the infection rate, b, and the GDP shortfall, p, to
exhibit two specific characteristics. Firstly, we expect a reduction in the infection rate as
the GDP shortfall increases, because we assume pandemic policies are designed to reduce
the infection rate, which result in a shortfall in the economic production as a side-effect.
Secondly, we expect the reduction in the infection rate to be greater at first, because we
expect measures to be enacted in order from more to less effective, and from less to more
disruptive. That is, the infection rate reductions exhibit a form of decreasing returns in
the GDP shortfall. We suggest that the percentage reduction in the infection rate, ∆b(%),
responds to the percentage reduction in GDP, ∆GDP(%), as follows:
∆b(%) = q1∆GDP(%)
q2 ,
in which q1 and q2 are constants, and q2 ∈ (0, 1).
The shortfall in production associated with each infection rate is, however, not straight-
forward to estimate. Firstly, GDP data is published several months late, which means that
a whole pandemic might have long since passed by the time the GDP data is published.
Secondly, GDP data are generally aggregated into months, quarters or years, which would
make it difficult to associate with a particular infection rate, which can vary greatly over
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these timeframes. Therefore, we infer the daily reduction in economic production from
the shortfall in electricity consumption: electricity consumption data for many countries
is available near real-time – often at sub-hourly resolution – and electricity consumption
is known to correlate well with economic activity (see, for instance, Trotter et al. (2016)
and Rodriguez and Trotter (2019)).
Data on electricity demand (load) is available for many European countries from
the ENTSO-E Transparency Platform8, and we utilise data from Europe’s five biggest
economies, which have all been significantly impacted by COVID-19: France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. To measure the daily shortfall in electricity con-
sumption, however, we we must compare the observed electricity consumption to what
it would have been under normal conditions. Therefore, we first need to create a coun-
terfactual representing the electricity consumption under normal conditions. We use the
automated forecasting procedure by Taylor and Letham (2017) to calibrate models on the
daily national electricity consumption (load) data from 2015 until March 1, 2020. This
period does not include the main impacts of the pandemic, such that forecasts from the
models for the period from March 1, 2020 to May 10, 2020 can act as counterfactuals –
how electricity consumption would have been expected to develop under normal condi-
tions. These counterfactuals may then be compared to the observed values in the same
period, and allows us to calculate the daily electricity consumption shortfall in terms of
percentages.
The relationship between electricity consumption and production has been the subject
of many studies (often as variants of “income elasticity of electricity consumption”), and,
synthesising the studies into a useful heuristic, we assume that a 1% decrease in electricity
consumption is associated with a 1.5% reduction in GDP. The estimated GDP shortfall
for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom are illustrated in Panel (a) of
Figure 5, which shows a clear increase in the GDP shortfall throughout March 2020, and a
stable shortfall of around 10%-20% throughout April and the start of May 2020, appearing
to correspond closely to the lockdown periods of these countries. Panel (b) of Figure 5
8Available at https://transparency.entsoe.eu/, accessed on 2020-05-13.
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Figure 5: Caption
shows the reduction in the infection rate for the five countries over the same time period,
with the base period for the infection rate considered to be the first seven days in March,
and it is clear that the infection rate has decreased as the GDP shortfall has dropped,
which is consistent with our expectations. The scatter plot of the estimated GDP shortfall
and the reduction in infection rates, shown in Figure 6, shows a clear relationship between
infection rate reductions and GDP shortfall. The red line in Figure 6 shows the model,
with constants estimated as in Table 4. The model fits the observations well, and the
estimated values for the constants, q1 and q2, conform to our expectations.
Table 5 summarises the chosen values for the parameters in the model. Having defined
parameter values such that the model represents the global economy under the impact of
COVID-19, we can now define scenarios that can be simulated numerically, and provide
insight into the impact of policy on both economic growth and the spread of the pandemic.
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Table 4
Dependent variable:
ln(∆b(%))
ln(∆GDP(%)) 0.238∗∗∗
(0.045)
Constant 3.677∗∗∗
(0.114)
Observations 45
R2 0.398
Adjusted R2 0.384
Residual Std. Error 0.383 (df = 43)
F Statistic 28.435∗∗∗ (df = 1; 43)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5: Parameter values.
Parameter Description Value
a1, a2 Logistic population growth (annual) 1.028, -2.282×10−12
δ Capital depreciation rate (annual) 4.46%
α Output elasticity of capital 0.3
g Growth rate of total factor productivity (annual) 1.3%
ρ Utility discount rate (annual) 8%
u Cost per hospital admission 5,722 USD
h Hospital admissions per confirmed case 14.7%
r Daily recovery rate per active infection 2.1%
b0 Base infection rate (no intervention) 2.041× 10−11
k1, k2 Mortality rate parameters, m = k1b
k2 12.561, 0.717
q1, q2 Infection rate parameters, ∆b(%) = q1∆GDP(%)
q2 3.677, 0.238
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2.3 Policy Experiments
To have a basis for comparison, we first simulate two baseline scenarios: the No Pandemic
scenario, in which no pandemic occurs, and the No Intervention scenario, in which the
pandemic occurs with no direct intervention (p = 0). Comparing the remaining scenarios
the to the first baseline scenario (No Pandemic) will help us understand the impact
of the pandemic. In addition, the baseline scenario will provide the initial conditions for
population and capital stock at the start of the pandemic, as this data is not yet available.
Comparing the remaining scenarios to the second baseline scenario (No Intervention) will
help us understand the impact of the simulated policy intervention. The initial values for
these simulations are shown in Table 6.
Having established the baseline scenarios, we run a series of simulations to investigate
three fundamental aspects of the policy intervention. First, we alter the timing of the
start of the intervention, to explore the advantages and disadvantages of starting the
intervention early or late. Second, we alter the degree of the intervention, to investigate
the differences in the impacts between light and severe interventions. And, finally, we alter
the duration of the intervention. That is, by running numerical experiments that vary the
policy interventions in commencement, degree and duration, we answer three fundamental
policy questions: “When?”, “How much?”, and “For how long?” When taken together,
these experiments will provide insight into the economic and health impacts of varying
policies along these three dimensions, and highlight the trade-offs that policymakers must
consider:
When to intervene? Holding the intervention degree and duration fixed at 10% and
26 weeks, we run simulations altering the start of the policy intervention between
February 27, 2020, and May 21, 2020, by two weeks at the time.
How much? Holding the starting date of the intervention fixed at March 12, 2020 – the
date when the WHO declared COVID-19 to be a pandemic – and the duration fixed
at 26 weeks, we alter the degree of the intervention from 5% to 25%, in steps of 10
percentage points.
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Table 6: Parameters used for the baseline scenarios.
Scenario Start date N0 I0 R0 D0 b0 A0 K0
No Pandemic 2019-01-01 7.634×109 0 0 0 0 1.880 2.775×1014
No Intervention 2020-01-22 7.718×109 510 28 17 2.041×10−11 1.906 2.827×1014
For how long? Keeping the starting date of the intervention fixed at March 12, 2020,
and the intervention degree fixed at 10%, we alter the duration of the intervention
from 4 weeks to 52 weeks, in steps of 8 weeks.
The initial values used in all these simulations are the same as in the No Intervention
scenario, specified in Table 6. Taken together, these three sequences of simulations will
provide important and actionable insights into the impacts of policy intervention on both
economic growth and on the spread of the pandemic that will help policymakers under-
stand the relevant trade-offs.
3 Results and Discussion
3.1 Backtest 1990-2010
Before presenting the simulation results, we first present the results of a backtest. This is
shown in Figure 7, and shows that the model captures the main features of the observed
historical data. Although the backtest in this case is not an out-of-sample test, due to
lack of data, the backtest provides strong support for the economic components of the
model.
3.2 Baseline Scenarios
The results of simulating the baseline scenarios – No Pandemic and No Intervention –
are shown in Figure 8. As expected, the No Pandemic scenario is characterised by steady
economic growth, and no infected or deceased individuals. The No Intervention scenario,
however, shows a large and abrupt drop of around 45% in production during the first
half of 2020, as the pandemic spreads through the population. The number of active
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Figure 7: Model backtest results. Panel (a): The simulated daily development of the global
physical capital stock and the daily imputed global physical capital stock. Panel (b): Global
daily simulated and observed population. Panel (c): Simulated and observed daily gross world
production. Panel (d): Simulated and observed daily global gross physical capital formation.
infections peaks in mid-June, 2020. As the pandemic subsides, a large proportion of the
labour force never returns as the mortalities reach 1.75 billion people, and production
recovers only to 85% of its pre-pandemic value before 2021. Although growth in economic
production resumes after the pandemic, production remains 20%-25% below the produc-
tion in the No Pandemic scenario until the end of the simulation in 2030. In summary,
the No Intervention scenario shows substantial loss of human life, as well as a lasting and
significant negative impact on production, and we expect that shrewd policy intervention
could partially mitigate these impacts.
In the following, we run model simulations to gain insight into when to start the policy
intervention, to what degree to intervene, and for how long the intervention should last.
3.3 When to Intervene?
We first run a series of simulations to examine the question of when a possible policy
intervention should start. In this series of simulations, the intervention degree is held
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Figure 8: Simulation results for the baseline scenarios.
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fixed at 10% (that is, the intervention causes a 10% decline in production), and the
duration of the intervention is held fixed at 26 weeks. Multiple simulations are run with
differing starting dates for the policy intervention. This series of simulations is shown in
Figure 9, with three possible starting dates for the policy intervention: April 9, May 21,
and July 2.
Examining Panel (f) of Figure 9, we note that intervening on July 2 allows the pan-
demic to spread almost identically to the No Intervention scenario – that is, July 2 is
too late for effective intervention because the peak in active infections has passed, most
of the damage is already done, and the pandemic is decelerating by itself. However, by
intervening when the number of active infections is near its highest, many mortalities
are avoided, and the human and economic damage is somewhat lower than in the No
Intervention scenario. Further, we note that intervening on April 2 does not appear to
significantly alter the course of the pandemic or mitigate its effects – intervening so early
in the pandemic only serves to delay the main wave of infections.
The intervention starting on May 21 – about one month before the peak of the No In-
tervention scenario – appears to be the most effective of our simulations, both considering
the economic impacts and the final mortality rate. May 21 appears to be just before the
inflection point of the No Intervention scenario, and the number of infections is growing
at its highest rate. Between the three simulated scenarios, this is by far the preferred
option.
It seems that timing the policy intervention is of great importance to mitigate both the
human and the economic impacts. Although we do not believe that the exact dates hold
for the COVID-19 pandemic in particular, these simulations lead us to interesting insights:
policy intervention appears to be most effective when the number of active infections is
approaching its inflection point, and is growing at its highest rate. An intervention that is
too early will only serve to delay the critical phase of the pandemic, and an intervention
after the peak has occurred will obviously do nothing to lower the peak. Although it may
be difficult to know beforehand when a pandemic will enter its critical phase, the timing
of the policy intervention is of paramount importance.
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Figure 9: Simulation results when varying the starting date of the policy intervention.
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3.4 How Much Intervention?
In this series of simulation, we keep the starting date of the policy intervention fixed at
March 12 and the duration of the policy intervention fixed at 26 weeks, whilst varying the
intervention degree. We simulate policies that reduce production by 5%, 15%, and 25%,
and the simulation results are shown in Figure 10.
The three simulations with different intervention degree, shown in Figure 10, suggest
that varying the degree of the intervention mainly alters the timing of the pandemic, but
does little to mitigate the economic and human impacts: apart from a delay in the main
phase of the pandemic, most variables behave similar to the No Intervention scenario.
This indifference between the degree of intervention is likely related to the relationship
we estimated between the GDP shortfall and the infection rate reduction, as shown in
Figure 6. There are strong diminishing returns, such that even an intervention of a small
degree (5%) already reduces the infection rate substantially (60%), and that additional
measures have a lower effect on the infection rate.
Essentially, the degree of the intervention – above a certain minimum level – appears
to be less important than the timing of the intervention.
3.5 For How Long to Intervene?
To analyse the impact of the duration of the policy intervention, we vary the duration of
the policy intervention, whilst maintaining the intervention degree fixed at 10% and the
starting date fixed at March 12. Figure 11 shows the results of simulating intervention
durations of 4 weeks, 28 weeks, 52 weeks and 76 weeks. It is clear from the figure that
the duration of the policy intervention can have a large impact on the trajectory of the
pandemic, and its human and economic aftermath.
From Figure 11, it seems that policies with longer durations policies clearly lead to
lower human and economic impacts, with a 76-week duratin – the longest of our simula-
tions – showing dramatically lower number of total mortalities, as well as a much quicker
post-pandemic recovery of production. The key appears to be that 76 weeks is sufficient
to include the peak in active infections of the trajectory suggested by the reduced infec-
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Figure 10: Simulation results when varying the degree of the policy intervention.
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Figure 11: Simulation results when varying the duration of the policy intervention.
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tion rate. This observation suggests that policies with a lower degree would require a
shorter duration, whereas policies with a higher degree would require a longer duration –
something which may, at first, appear counter-intuitive.
3.6 Considerations, Limitations, and Concerns
We have tried to make sensible modelling choices in this study, but, like all models, our
model is a simplification that focuses only on certain aspects, and ignores others. The
simulation results should not be understood literally : the intention of our model has never
been to provide numerically accurate predictions, but to generate insights into the impacts
of policy interventions by analysing the dynamics of the system as a whole. Although the
insights from the numerical simulations can contribute to improving policy interventions
during pandemics, it is important to appreciate the limitations of our model and results.
We are, however, greatly concerned about the quality of the parameters used for the
epidemiological part of the model: there is a great deal of doubt and uncertainty about
the quality of the official datasets on the spread of the pandemic – that is, the number of
confirmed cases, recovered cases and mortalities. There is a general sense that the number
of confirmed cases is not representative for the number of infections, as testing is severely
lacking in many regions. The lack of testing also affects the number of mortalities due to
the pandemic, and number of recovered cases. Although we have used the data that is
available without much discrimination, we share the concerns of many other researchers
as to the quality of this data.
It is also unusual for a model of economic growth to operate at a daily resolution. We
do not think this directly invalidates our resulting insights, although it means that the
parameter values may appear unusual to researchers and practicioners, and that special
care must be taken in the interpretation of the results. An alternative would be to
develop the model in continuous time, which might be more familiar to some. However,
in that case it would be necessary to discretise the model later for performing numerical
experiments – the model would, in the end, be the same, so presenting the model directly
in discrete time appears to be a simpler alternative.
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The parameter values were chosen for the model to represent the global economy and
the global spread of COVID-19. There are, however, large differences between regions
in the world. For instance, the five countries used for estimating the economic impact
of policy measures – France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, which
were chosen for their data availability – are probably not entirely representative for the
rest of the world. There is also no global central government that implements global
policy, and our insights are therefore not directly applicable by any specific authority.
The purpose of the study, however, was not to generate recommendations for specific
actions, but to generate insights into the impacts and trade-offs that policy interventions
must consider. Regional, national and local policy can differ from “global” policy – and
probably should, as policy can be optimised to local conditions – but the insights on
intervention timing, degree and duration may nevertheless be useful at these levels also.
It would be possible to adapt the model for use at regional, national or local scales. In
this case, we would recommend considering replacing the linear admission costs with a
specification that allows for increasing marginal costs of admissions, which might better
reflect increasing costs in the short run due to capacity saturation.
The model does not incorporate any demographic heterogeneity. Since some pan-
demics appear to affect people with certain demographic characteristics differently, this
may bias the results. For instance, the mortality rate of COVID-19 appears to differ
greatly between old and young people: if the disease has a greater impact on groups
that were not originally included in the work force anyway, the model could exaggerate
the economic impact of the pandemic by disconsidering demographic heterogeneity. We
do not believe this to affect the main insights derived from our model simulations, since
we do not think it substantially alters the dynamics of the system. However, it would
certainly be an issue for the “predictive accuracy” of the simulations.
Since the model is deterministic, agents in the model have perfect foresight from the
very start of the simulation. This is, naturally, not true in the real world, in which there are
large uncertainties about future developments. This gives the model agents an unrealistic
ability to plan for the future, and the economic portion of the model should therefore be
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considered an optimistic path. Another detail that also may positively bias the outcomes,
is that the model does not include structural damages – such as bankruptcies, institutional
change, changing habits, and so forth – and affords the model agents much more flexibility
than economic agents may have in reality, where they may be facing additional restrictions.
Finally, we only simulated very simple policies for the purpose of understanding the
impact of altering the policy in a very specific way. For instance, superior policies can
be made relatively easily by allowing the degree of the intervention to vary during the
pandemic. Our examples, in which starting dates, degree and duration are fixed, only
served for illutration and to understand some of the dimensions of policy intervention.
We reiterate that our purpose has not been to provide numerically accurate predictions
– nor the means to generate accurate predictions – of the evolution of the COVID-19
pandemic or the global economy. We have only explored particular aspects of effective
policy responses to a pandemic, using a very high-level and theoretical approach, and it is
with this in mind that our results are most appropriately appreciated. Our research does
not aim to offer specific guidance for world authorities on the handling of the COVID-19
pandemic, but to analyse how a pandemic interacts with the global economy and thus
help establish a set of of general guidelines.
4 Conclusion
We have presented a mathematical model for the joint evolution of the economy and
a pandemic, based on incorporating the dynamics of the SIR model that describes the
spread of epidemics into a neoclassical economic growth model framework. This model is
subsequently adapted to represent the global economy under the impact of the COVID-
19 pandemic by selecting appropriate functional forms and parameter values. The model
includes a parameter that represents policy, by which economic production can be lowered
in exchange for a reduced infection rate.
Using the calibrated model, we simulate the joint evolution of the economy and the
pandemic for a series of policy assumptions, in order to discover what is the most effective
timing of a policy intervention, what degree of policy intervention is most effective, and
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how long policy intervention should last.
Our experiments suggest that it is most effective to start the policy intervention slightly
before the number of confirmed cases grows at its highest rate. Not only does this help
lower the peak in active infections, it also reduces the economic impact and the number
of mortalities. Starting too early can delay the pandemic, but does not otherwise signifi-
cantly alter its course, whereas starting after the peak in active infections can obviously
not impact the peak.
Furthermore, altering the degree of the intervention does not appear to greatly in-
fluence the evolution of the pandemic nor the economy, other than cause minor delays.
We ascribe the lack of effect to the concave relationship that we estimated between in-
tervention degree and infection rate reduction, as a large reduction in infection rate can
be achieved by sacrificing a modest proportion of economic production, and appears to
show strong decreasing returns thereafter. Our estimates suggest that a 60% reduction
in the infection rate can be achieved by sacrificing only 5% of production, whereas a 70%
reduction in infection rate could be achieved for a 10% reduction in production.
Altering the duration of the intervention showed that interventions with a longer
duration lead to significantly lower mortalities and a quicker post-pandemic recovery in
economic production. The key observation is that the policy must include the peak of the
new path set out by the reduced infection rate: in short, policy intervention should last
until the peak has passed.
Although the scenarios we present are not necessarily numerically accurate as predic-
tions – mostly due to generalisations made for modelling purposes, large regional varia-
tions, and large uncertainties in the parameters – our conclusions are based mainly on
the dynamics revealed by the policy experiments, and not specifically on their numerical
values. As such, we hope that our model can serve as a tool for enhancing our under-
standing of the design of effective policies against the spread of pandemics, and that our
insights can contribute to this discussion and provide general guidelines for policymakers.
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Data and Code Availability
All the data used in this study is available to the public, and the various data sources
have been referenced at the appropriate places along the study.
The custom computer code for running the simulations will be made available in an
online repository.
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